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I. INTRODUCTION
Women have struggled to achieve equality with men in American society. 
From being excluded from fundamental participation in America’s democratic 
process to lacking access to higher education, American women have faced 
countless acts of marginalization.1 Women have worked tirelessly to advance 
women’s position and opportunities in American society, often through 
advocating for constitutional reform, such as the Nineteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which granted women the right to vote, and legislative 
reform, such as Title IX, aimed to remedy challenges for women in education.2
Advancing rights for women in the workplace has been a yet further 
complicated issue for women’s rights advocates due to the significant 
influence of corporations in the American political system.3 As such, 
legislators are often forced to craft narrow legislation fraught with loopholes, 
even if the legislation is intended to address a widespread, pervasive problem 
in American society; often, due to the passage of time, these limited statutes 
become insufficient to provide remedies for the issues they aimed to address.4
Such was the case with the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Congress enacted the 
Equal Pay Act in 1963 in order to address the substantial pay gap between men 
and women in the American workplace.5 In 1963, women made approximately 
58.9 cents for every dollar a man made, indicating a wage gap of 41.1% when 
                                                                                                                     
1 See Part V.A (discussing barriers women face in the workplace context alone).
2 See The Fight for Women’s Suffrage, HIST. CHANNEL (2009), http://www.history.co
m/topics/womens-history/the-fight-for-womens-suffrage [https://perma.cc/XF5C-QWAT] 
(discussing the women’s suffrage movement and passage of the Nineteenth Amendment);
Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/overview-title-ix-education-amendments-1972-20-usc-1681-et-
seq [https://perma.cc/ZZM7-9RS8] (last updated Aug. 7, 2015) (providing information 
about Title IX).
3 Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-
corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/ [https://perma.cc/LP6Q-
CHBQ] (discussing the influence of corporations on the American political system). 
4 David John Marotta, What Is Rent-Seeking Behavior?, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/02/24/what-is-rent-seeking-behavior/#3d8
4469a7f24 [https://perma.cc/8W5H-VTN3] (discussing the influence of rent-seeking in 
legislation). 
5 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (“Congress’ purpose in 
enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic 
problem of employment discrimination in private industry . . . .”).
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the Equal Pay Act was signed into law.6 For women of color, the wage gap 
was more substantial, with black women earning only 43.2 cents for every 
dollar earned by a white male in 1967—the earliest year for which data is 
available.7
Conditions for American women in the workplace have improved, but the 
wage gap remains substantial. In 2010, women earned 77.4 cents per dollar 
earned by men,8 and in 2013, women earned 78% of what men earned.9 In 
historically male-dominated fields, the wage gap widens more significantly, 
with women earning 67% of men’s earnings in the field of natural resources, 
construction, and maintenance and 71% in the field of police and sheriff’s
patrol officers.10
As the wage gap between men and women continues to persist in a 
meaningful way more than fifty years after the enactment of the Equal Pay 
Act, it is necessary to evaluate the ways in which the legislation has provided 
access to the remedies it intended and the ways in which the Act has fallen 
short. One of the most significant shortcomings of the Equal Pay Act has been 
the interpretation of its affirmative defenses for employers.11
Although the Equal Pay Act was passed with the intention of eradicating
the pay gap between American men and women, its ability to provide legal 
recourse for those who experience wage discrimination has been significantly 
limited by the courts’ interpretation of the “factor other than sex” defense 
provided in the statute.12 Courts have allowed employers to escape liability by 
construing inherently gendered factors of employment, such as negotiating for 
pay and benefits, as “factors other than sex,” consequently limiting women’s
potential for a legal remedy under the Equal Pay Act.13
This Note examines the current status of Equal Pay Act litigation and the 
application of the “factor other than sex” defense to an inherently gendered 
practice: negotiations in the workplace. Part II describes the pay gap as it was 
in 1963 and still exists today in order to evidence the continuing need for a 
                                                                                                                     
6 Abby Lane & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, The Wage Gap Over Time, NAT’L
WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 3, 2012), http://nwlc.org/wage-gap-over-time/ [https://perma.cc/D
Z7X-SXXJ]. 
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EQUAL PAY, http://www.dol.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/featured/equalpay/equalpay-78cents.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JZR-
T7ER].
10 Id.
11 See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). The Equal Pay Act provides four 
statutory affirmative defenses for employers. The fourth affirmative defense, “any other 
factor other than sex,” has created many issues with the Equal Pay Act’s enforcement. Id.
12 Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender 
Difference in Salary Negotiation Is Not a ‘‘Factor Other than Sex’’ Under the Equal Pay 
Act, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10–19 (2009) (discussing the ways in which the courts 
have interpreted negotiation as a factor other than sex). 
13 Id.
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legal remedy under the Equal Pay Act. Part III discusses the text of the Equal 
Pay Act and how it has been interpreted by the courts. Part IV addresses the 
“factor other than sex” defense and how it has been applied in the courts. 
Part V discusses the impact of negotiation in the workplace, particularly in 
relation to decisions about pay and opportunities for promotion, which 
inherently affect an employee’s pay. This Part also addresses the social science 
research that indicates that salary negotiation has different effects and 
outcomes for men and women, whether intended or not. Part V then focuses 
on the problems associated with construing negotiation as a factor other than 
sex and the ineffectiveness of previously proposed solutions. This Part also 
proposes legislation to remove the possibility of construing negotiation as a 
factor other than sex for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act.
II. THE GENDER PAY GAP: THEN AND NOW
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963 in an effort to eradicate pay 
discrimination based on gender.14 This discrepancy in pay based on the gender 
of an employee is often referred to as the pay gap or wage gap.15 Most often, 
the difference in wage is expressed in one of two ways. The first, median 
earnings, is expressed in the percentage disparity between men’s median 
income and women’s median income; this is a numerical representation of the 
pay gap itself.16 The second numerical means of stating the disparity in pay is 
through an earnings ratio, which evaluates women’s earnings as a percentage 
of men’s earnings.17 The earnings ratio is the most common expression of the 
“pay gap,” even though it represents a ratio rather than the pay gap itself.18
The common expression of the pay disparity between American men and 
American women is often the statement of women making so many cents for 
                                                                                                                     
14 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
15 ROSA CHO & ABAGAIL KRAMER, INT’L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN,
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE EQUAL PAY ACT 6–7, http://www.icrw.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Everything-You-Need-to-Know-about-the-Equal-Pay-Act.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/467T-ZZEY] (discussing the various means and methods of calculating 
the pay gap). 
16 Id. at 6. The equation used to calculate this means of expressing the pay gap is 
dividing the difference between men’s and women’s median earnings by men’s median 
earnings (Pay gap = (men’s median earnings - women’s median earnings) / men’s median 
earnings). Id. For example, if men’s and women’s median earnings were $48,202 and 
$37,118, respectively, the pay gap would be stated as 23%. Id.
17 Id. The earnings ratio is calculated by dividing women’s earnings by men’s
earnings (Earnings ratio = women’s median earnings / men’s median earnings). Id. For 
example, if men’s and women’s median earnings were $48,202 and $37,118, respectively, 
the pay gap would be stated as 77%. Id. at 6–7.
18 Sarah Jane Glynn, Explaining the Gender Wage Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(May 19, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2014/05/19/90
039/explaining-the-gender-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/XA76-N43W].
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every dollar a man earns.19 Though the pay gap is not as severe as it was when 
the Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963, it still persists in the American 
workforce and has significant implications in women’s lives. 
A. The Pay Gap in 1963
When the Equal Pay Act became law in 1963, women made 58.9% of 
men’s earnings, indicating a pay gap of 41.1%.20 The pay gap had mostly 
grown in the years leading up to the passage of the Equal Pay Act with a 
39.3% gap in 1960, a 40.8% gap in 1961, and a 40.7% gap in 1962.21
Pay inequity between men and women had been prevalent in the American 
economy since the advent of the nation itself, but traditionally so few women 
were in the American workforce that the concerns of unequal pay were not at 
the forefront of the American conscience.22 During the early twentieth century, 
women accounted for less than 24% of the American workforce.23 But World 
War I and World War II called away many men to service in the Armed 
Forces, and employers were forced to hire women into the positions left open 
during wartime that had been traditionally held by men.24 During these times 
of war when women were working in historically male-dominated 
employment sectors, male workers and unions began to advocate for equal pay 
between men and women.25 Their advocacy, however, was not based on 
notions of equality between the sexes but rather grew out of the fear that 
employers would choose to retain female workers after the men returned if 
companies could pay women a cheaper wage or dilute male workers’ wage 
once they returned to the same positions.26 In order to protect jobs and rate of 
pay for American men, it became necessary for women to be paid the same.27
This push for pay equity was encouraged in both the public and private 
sectors and garnered support from public officials, such as Secretary of Labor 
                                                                                                                     
19 See, e.g., WOMEN’S BUREAU, supra note 9. In 2013, the Women’s Bureau for the 
Department of Labor stated that women made 78 cents for every dollar a man makes. Id. 
20 Lane & Robbins, supra note 6.
21 Id.
22 Equal Pay Act of 1963, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/articles/equal-
pay-act.htm [https://perma.cc/4VG4-UF92] (explaining the development of the equal pay 
movement).
23 Id.
24 Charlotte Alter, Here’s the History of the Battle for Equal Pay for American 
Women, TIME (Apr. 14, 2015), http://time.com/3774661/equal-pay-history/ [https://perma.c
c/DN9E-YHA8] (discussing the historical events and atmosphere that gave rise to the fight 
for equal pay). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.
27 Id.; Equal Pay Act of 1963, supra note 22.
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Lewis Schwellenbach.28 As men began to return from the Wars and reenter the 
workforce, however, women were again expected to stay at home rather than 
work, and the push for an equal pay amendment was unsuccessful.29
National pay equity legislation was finally successful in 1963 when 
President John F. Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act into law.30 The Equal 
Pay Act required that men and women be paid equally, but federal law did not 
require equal treatment of the sexes in the workplace until the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was passed the following year.31
Following the passage of the Equal Pay Act, the pay gap began to slowly 
narrow, though there were some years in which the pay gap increased rather 
than decreased.32 The pay gap reached its widest point in 1973, at which time 
the gap was 43.4%, meaning women were making less than 57 cents per every 
dollar made by their male counterparts.33 In the years since 1973, the gap has 
again narrowed but has remained rather stagnant for the past decade.34
B. The Pay Gap Today
Although the pay gap has narrowed substantially since the Equal Pay Act 
became law, the pay gap has remained at approximately 23% for the past 
decade.35 This data gave rise to the oft quoted statistic that a woman is paid 77 
cents for every dollar a man makes.36 Although this statistic is often cited in 
many discussions of pay inequality, the number is probably now at 79.6 cents 
rather 77.37 It is currently estimated that, if current trends continue, women 
may not reach equality in pay until 2059.38
In an effort to raise awareness about pay inequality, the National 
Committee on Pay Equity (NCPE) started Equal Pay Day in 1996.39 The day is 
intended to symbolize “how far into the year women must work to earn what 
                                                                                                                     
28 Alter, supra note 24. In support of an equal pay amendment, Schwellenbach, then-
Secretary of Labor, stated, “There is no sex difference in the food she buys or the rent she 
pays, there should be none in her pay envelope.” Id.
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Lane & Robbins, supra note 6. In 1966, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1975,
the pay gap was larger than it was at the time of the Equal Pay Act’s enactment. Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. 
37 The Wage Gap over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap, NAT’L
COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html [https://perma.cc/F
U9Z-7EHB] (last updated Sept. 2016). 
38 Id. 
39 Equal Pay Day, NAT’L COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-
equity.org/day.html [https://perma.cc/PD38-CPEE] (discussing the creation of Equal Pay 
Day as a means to raise awareness about pay inequality). 
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men earned in the previous year.”40 The NCPE encourages those committed to 
achieving equal pay between men and women to wear red to “symbolize how 
far women and minorities are ‘in the red’ with their pay[.]”41 Equal Pay Day 
has been endorsed by many prominent entities, such as the White House42 and 
the National Women’s Law Center,43 in acknowledgment of the continued 
existence of the wage gap in the American workforce and its impact on 
women throughout the country. 
Despite the efforts of many to raise awareness of, and concern for, the 
gender pay gap, many people still question its existence, impact, and 
severity.44 Although the pay gap has been disputed for a number of reasons, 
ranging from an overstatement of the severity of the gap45 to assertions that 
women are complaining without good reason,46 many of the reasons offered in 
opposition to the gendered pay gap are related to gender themselves. For 
example, some of the most common responses to the pay gap are that women 
choose to stay home with children or pursue less high-stress—and thereby 
often higher-paying—careers in order to be able to spend more time with 
families.47 These are constraints imposed on working wives and mothers 
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. 
41 Id.
42 President Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation – National Equal Pay Day, 
2015, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/0
4/13/presidential-proclamation-national-equal-pay-day-2015 [https://perma.cc/7WR7-
QMHW]. President Obama has since made additional statements calling for the passage of 
legislation to address the continuing existence of the pay gap in America. See infra Part 
V.D.2.
43 Lane & Robbins, supra note 6.
44 See Matthew Cochran, There Is No Wage Gap: Feminists Want Equal Pay for
Unequal Work, FEDERALIST (May 6, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/06/there-is-
no-wage-gap-feminists-want-equal-pay-for-unequal-work/ [https://perma.cc/VA8P-V4LA]; 
Glenn Kessler, President Obama’s Persistent ‘77-Cent’ Claim on the Wage Gap Gets a 
New Pinocchio Rating, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/fact-checker/wp/2014/04/09/president-obamas-persistent-77-cent-claim-on-the-wage-gap
-gets-a-new-pinocchio-rating/ [https://perma.cc/9L7T-MJ6X]; see also Mark J. Perry & 
Andrew G. Biggs, The ‘77 Cents on the Dollar’ Myth About Women’s Pay, WALL STREET 
J. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023035327045794837529
09957472 [https://perma.cc/H9GV-CTUD]; Sabrina L. Schaeffer, Pure Politics: Myth of 
Equal Pay Day, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/opinions/schaeffer-equal-pay-day/ 
[https://perma.cc/XU38-WHLF] (last updated Apr. 14, 2015).
45 Kessler, supra note 44.
46 Cochran, supra note 44.
47 Eileen Patten, On Equal Pay Day, Key Facts About the Gender Pay Gap, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/14/on-equal-pay-day-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/8KVY-GFZJ]. 
This catch-22 for working mothers is commonly referred to as the difficulties of women 
trying to ‘‘have it all.’’ See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,
ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-
women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/ [https://perma.cc/DJX9-79AK] (arguing that women 
still cannot “have it all”). 
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because they are women and are less pervasive in the lives, and salaries, of 
working husbands and fathers.48 Regardless of its criticisms or rationales, the 
data indicates that the gender pay gap still exists in the American workforce 
and has a great effect on women’s lives.49 In light of this persistence of pay 
inequality, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the Equal Pay Act has 
or has not been successful in its purpose of remedying the pay disparities 
between men and women.50
III. THE EQUAL PAY ACT’S EFFECTIVENESS
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 with the hopes of providing a 
remedy for gendered pay inequity to American employees in both the public 
and private sector.51 The purpose of the legislation was to assure that “those 
who perform tasks which are determined to be equal shall be paid equal 
wages.”52 The Senate aimed to dispel the antiquated notion that because of 
their role in society, men deserved to be paid more than women.53 As the pay 
gap continues to exist in a meaningful way, the Equal Pay Act has fallen short 
of its intended purpose. In light of the shortcomings of the Equal Pay Act,54 it 
is necessary to consider the ways in which courts’ interpretations of the Equal 
Pay Act have contributed to its inability to fully eradicate pay discrimination. 
A. The Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963 as an amendment to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.55 The Fair Labor Standards Act applies to both private and 
public employers and provides standards for the payment of wages, such as 
minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor.56 As the Equal Pay Act 
focused on discrimination in pay, its addition to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
as an amendment was a logical fit.57
                                                                                                                     
48 The Gender Pay Gap – Myth vs. Fact, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN,
http://now.org/resource/the-gender-pay-gap-myth-vs-fact/ [https://perma.cc/F6WZ-YT74] 
(discussing the implication on pay for working mothers). 
49 WOMEN’S BUREAU, supra note 9.
50 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
51 The Equal Pay Act amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, under which employees 
can recover from both public and private employers. H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963). 
52 S. REP. NO. 88-176 (1963). 
53 Id. 
54 Peter Avery, Note, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It 
Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 850 (2004). 
55 See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012)).
56 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
57 See S. REP. NO. 88-176.
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The text of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 forbids pay discrimination on the 
basis of sex and provides four defenses for employers.58 The provision on 
discrimination in pay goes on to include specific considerations when a case 
implicates a labor organization.59 The statute additionally provides that those 
who violate the Equal Pay Act are liable for the unpaid wages as dictated by 
the main text of the Fair Labor Standards Act.60
Although the requirement of a comparator or “substantial equality”
between two positions has posed issues for plaintiffs pursuing Equal Pay Act 
claims,61 many of the limitations of the Equal Pay Act have been the result of 
the affirmative defenses62 enumerated in the statute itself and the interpretation 
of those defenses by the courts.63 The “factor other than sex” defense has 
created great difficulties for plaintiffs alleging wage discrimination under the 
Equal Pay Act.64
B. Early Interpretation by the Courts
Cases involving the interpretation of the Equal Pay Act made their way up 
through the federal court system relatively quickly. One of the earliest, and 
most noteworthy, cases of the Equal Pay Act’s jurisprudence came only seven 
years after the legislation was signed into law.65 In 1970, the Third Circuit 
decided Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co. and began shaping the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                     
58 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (“No employer having employees subject to any provisions 
of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are 
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the 
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; 
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That 
an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, 
in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any 
employee.”).
59 Id. § 206(d)(2), (4). 
60 Id. § 206(d)(3). 
61 Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1078, 1080–81 (1984). 
62 The statute provides for four affirmative defenses: “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; 
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
63 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of 
Summary Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 815, 817 (2012/2013) 
(discussing the impact of the Equal Pay Act’s affirmative defenses on plaintiffs’ lack of 
success at the summary judgment stage).
64 Ellen M. Bowden, Closing the Pay Gap: Redefining the Equal Pay Act’s Fourth 
Affirmative Defense, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 226 (1994).
65 See generally Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
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the Equal Pay Act as it is known today. In Shultz, the Third Circuit reversed a 
district court ruling for the defendant, and in doing so held for the Secretary of 
Labor, who was advocating for the payment of back wages to female 
employees who had been paid less than their male counterparts.66 The court 
found that the male and female employees performed equal work and deserved 
equal pay, and that the 10% wage discrepancy was based on gender.67 The 
Third Circuit found that the employer did not carry its burden of proving that 
its pay disparity was based on a factor other than sex, as there was no evidence 
of the “economic value” of the male labor sufficient to justify the difference in 
pay.68 Though certainly not a radical decision by current standards, it 
represented a major victory under the Equal Pay Act in line with Congress’s
purpose to be “a broad charter of women’s rights in the economic field.”69
It was not long after the passage of the Equal Pay Act that cases involving 
the interpretation of the statute made their way up to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.70 In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan and held for the Secretary of Labor.71 In an opinion by Justice 
Marshall, the Court found a violation of the Equal Pay Act to have occurred 
when the employer paid female daytime inspectors a lower base wage than 
male nighttime inspectors.72 The employer had not met its burden to prove that 
the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.73 The Court found 
that working the night shift was not a “working condition[]” sufficient to 
satisfy the affirmative defense and therefore was not a justifiable reason to pay 
men and women differently.74 The Court also made a strong statement of 
Congress’s purpose in passing the Equal Pay Act, stating that “Congress’
purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was perceived to 
be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination.”75 The 
Court’s decision expressed a willingness to follow the intent of Congress in 
passing pay equity legislation through a narrow reading of the affirmative 
defenses provided in the statute.76
                                                                                                                     
66 Id. at 266–67.
67 Id. at 264.
68 Id. at 266–67. 
69 Id. at 265. The Third Circuit elaborated on this purpose: “It sought to overcome the 
age-old belief in women’s inferiority and to eliminate the depressing effects on living 
standards of reduced wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences 
which flow from it.” Id.
70 See generally Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
71 Id. at 209–10.
72 Id. at 190–91.
73 Id. at 196–97. 
74 Id. at 202–04.
75 Id. at 195. The Court additionally discussed Congress’s intent to eradicate wage 
structures based on “outmoded” beliefs that men should be paid more because of the male 
role in society. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-176 (1963)).
76 Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196–97 (holding that the different working 
conditions between the day and night shift were not a factor other than sex).
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In 1988, the Sixth Circuit ruled on a case that evidenced both the courts’
early willingness to enforce the Equal Pay Act and the later reluctance to find 
employers liable for pay discrimination.77 The court left open the possibility 
that the disparate impact framework could be applicable to Equal Pay Act 
claims but held that J.C. Penney’s “head of household” rule for awarding 
fringe benefits to its employees was a factor other than sex and justified a 
disparity in pay.78 This case presented an early indication of the shift in the 
courts toward a broader reading of the “factor other than sex” defense, which 
in turn limited liability for employers under the Equal Pay Act. 
The early decisions in the federal courts evidence the willingness of the 
courts to interpret the Equal Pay Act in accordance with Congress’s intent in 
passing the legislation,79 which early on included reading the affirmative 
defenses narrowly to encompass only true nongender-based reasons for an 
existing pay differential. The current interpretation in the courts, as 
foreshadowed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney
Co., looks quite different from the early willingness to provide a true remedy 
to victims of pay discrimination.80
C. Current Interpretation of the EPA by the Courts
Courts in recent years have backed away from the more expansive reading 
of the Equal Pay Act that was dominant in the years immediately following its 
enactment.81 Plaintiffs have had difficulty overcoming summary judgment in 
Equal Pay Act cases in the past decade or so and even more difficulty winning 
them.82
In order to bring a successful Equal Pay Act claim, plaintiffs must first 
present evidence that a coworker of the opposite sex is paid more and that their 
positions are “substantially equal.”83 This requirement derives from the 
comparator requirement in the text of the Equal Pay Act.84 Courts vary in their 
                                                                                                                     
77 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 
254 (6th Cir. 1988). 
78 Id. at 252. 
79 See Part III.B. 
80 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 816–17; see also Avery, supra note 54, at 850. 
81 See Avery, supra note 54, at 850. 
82 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 817. 
83 Edwards v. Fulton County, 509 F. App’x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(“[T]he plaintiff need not show that his position and the comparator’s are identical but 
rather that the two positions are ‘substantially equal.’” (quoting Arrington v. Cobb County, 
139 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 1998))); Beck–Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 362 (6th Cir. 
2006) (“In determining whether a comparator is appropriate for the purposes of an EPA 
claim, our focus is on actual job requirements and duties, rather than job classifications or 
titles.”).
84 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a 
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such 
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application of the “substantially equal” element of the Equal Pay Act’s prima 
facie case, some requiring essentially identical positions.85
Though “substantially equal” positions are required to successfully bring 
an Equal Pay Act claim, the positions do not always have to have the same 
title.86 In Beck–Wilson v. Principi, the Sixth Circuit held that a nurse 
practitioner and a physician assistant were capable of being substantially equal 
positions even though they had different job titles.87 The circuit court reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer.88
In most cases, however, courts are more willing to uphold grants of 
summary judgment due to an employee’s failure to meet the court’s substantial 
equality standard.89 To allege a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act and 
meet the substantial equality requirement, a plaintiff must prove: 1) the 
employer pays a member of the opposite sex a different wage; 2) the plaintiff 
and the member of the opposite sex perform equal work; and 3) the working 
conditions under which the jobs are performed are similar.90 To prove the 
second factor—that the positions are substantially equal—the “plaintiff must 
establish that the jobs compared entail common duties or content, and do not 
simply overlap in titles or classifications.”91 In Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Port Authority, the Second Circuit held that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had not sufficiently 
presented facts to show that male and female nonsupervisory attorneys at the 
Port Authority held “substantially equal” positions.92 In short, despite using 
similar “evaluative criteria” and having the same job code for both male and 
female nonsupervisory attorneys, the court found that the positions were not 
“substantially equal” because the EEOC had discussed the job duties of 
attorneys broadly and without reference to the specific work of these 
attorneys.93
                                                                                                                     
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, 
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
85 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 
SMU L. REV. 17, 37–46 (2010). In a later article, Eisenberg discusses the high number of 
Equal Pay Act cases that are dismissed on summary judgment. Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 
832–33. She, in part, attributes this trend to the strict requirements for proving 
“substantially equal.” Id.
86 See Beck–Wilson, 441 F.3d at 361.
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 356.
89 See Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 17.
90 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 254–55 (2d 
Cir. 2014).
91 Id. at 255.
92 Id. at 258 (“Simply put, the EEOC has not alleged a single nonconclusory fact 
supporting its assertion that the claimants’ and comparators’ jobs required ‘substantially 
equal’ skill and effort.”).
93 Id. 
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As evidenced above, it is hard to predict what positions a court will find 
“substantially equal.” Courts can find substantial equality when the job titles 
are different94 but not find substantial equality between male and female 
employees with the same job code.95 Due to the uncertainty in the Equal Pay 
Act’s prima facie case, many cases turn on the application of the affirmative 
defenses, mainly the Equal Pay Act’s “factor other than sex” defense, which 
has been interpreted inconsistently in the courts.96
IV. FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX AS A DEFENSE
The Equal Pay Act provides for four statutory affirmative defenses: a pay 
system based on seniority, a merit-based system, a pay system based on 
quality of production or quantity, or a pay “differential based on any other 
factor other than sex.”97 The first three defenses refer to systems that base an 
individual’s pay on an established evaluative system. The “factor other than 
sex” defense, however, is a catchall defense without much specificity as to its 
application provided in the statutory language.98 Due to the lack of detail in 
the statute, the courts have inconsistently applied the defense, leading to 
confusion for both employers and employees.99 Often, this confusion and 
inconsistency has led to success for employers in asserting the defense and 
defeat for employees seeking to assert Equal Pay Act claims.100
As mentioned above, the “factor other than sex” defense has come to play 
a pivotal role, in part due to the inconsistent requirements of the Equal Pay 
Act’s prima facie case.101 After an employee has made her prima facie case, 
the employer is then afforded the opportunity to raise one of the Equal Pay 
Act’s affirmative defenses.102 Due to the wide scope of the “factor other than 
sex” defense and the discretionary nature of many employment decisions, the 
                                                                                                                     
94 E.g., Beck–Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 361 (6th Cir. 2006).
95 E.g., Port Auth., 768 F.3d at 258.
96 See Bowden, supra note 64, at 226.
97 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a 
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . except 
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a 
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential 
based on any other factor other than sex . . . .”).
98 The statute itself only states that the differential falls under the exception if it is 
based on “any factor other than sex.” Id. 
99 Bowden, supra note 64, at 226, 233–34. 
100 See id. 
101 See generally id. (discussing various situations where employers used the courts’
inconsistent application of the “factor other than sex” defense to defeat EPA claims). For 
further discussion, see supra Part III.C.
102 Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Once a plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA, the defendant must show 
the pay disparity was justified by one of four permissible reasons . . . .”). 
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Equal Pay Act’s fourth affirmative defense is invoked by employers quite 
frequently.103
A. Interpretation in the Courts
The “factor other than sex” defense has been interpreted to be a catchall 
defense for employers.104 Some courts have focused on the use of the word 
“any” in the statutory language and have held that even “[r]andom” pay 
decisions can be justified as a factor other than sex.105 Other courts require the 
employer to articulate a “legitimate business reason.”106 The “factor other than 
sex” defense is most commonly used to justify pay disparities based on: an 
informal seniority system, qualifications of the plaintiff (for example,
education, performance, or experience), “‘market forces’ or business 
judgment,” and prior or negotiated salaries.107
When asserting the “factor other than sex” defense, the employer bears the 
burden of production and persuasion, because it is an affirmative defense.108
As such, the employer is required to “prove, and not just assert” that the pay 
differential was the result of a factor other than sex.109 In King v. Acosta Sales,
the Seventh Circuit, which has held that even a “random” factor can qualify as 
a factor other than sex, reversed a grant of summary judgment for an employer 
when an employer did not sufficiently justify both initial pay disparities as 
well as unequal salary raises based allegedly on employees’ education level.110
Though the Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment 
involving education as a factor other than sex in King v. Acosta Sales &
Marketing, Inc., differences in experience and education are frequently 
considered acceptable factors other than sex.111 The rationale is often stated as 
allowing employers to “reward” additional experience or education for 
someone in the same position.112 This use of the “factor other than sex”
defense is closely related to the “market forces” application of the “factor 
other than sex” defense, which allows employers to base pay off of “legitimate 
                                                                                                                     
103 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 836 (stating that nearly half of the claims analyzed 
asserted the “factor other than sex” defense). 
104 See Bowden, supra note 64, at 226.
105 E.g., King v. Acosta Sales & Mktg., Inc., 678 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“Random decision is a factor other than sex.”).
106 E.g., Beck–Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 365–66 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 
1988)).
107 Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 819.
108 King, 678 F.3d at 474.
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 474–75.
111 See Bowden, supra note 64, at 243.
112 E.g., Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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market forces.”113 These “forces” often include consideration of what the 
market rate for a particular position would be or the assumed market rate for 
an employee of certain experience or education level.114
Consideration of experience, education, and market forces often go hand
in hand with another common type of factor other than sex justification: prior 
salary.115 Although some courts require that a factor other than sex relate to a 
legitimate business reason—including use of prior salary in determining pay—
not all courts follow this approach.116 In those circuits, use of prior salary is 
acceptable even if it is not related to the position at issue or business related.117
If discrimination was suspected in the prior salary in a circuit without the 
legitimate business reason rule, that wage disparity, as well as the current 
disparity at issue, must be proven to have occurred because of the employee’s
sex in order for the prior salary not to be an acceptable factor other than sex.118
Although the broad reading of the “factor other than sex” defense can be 
justified by the inclusion of the word “any” in the statute,119 this interpretation 
has created a large loophole through which employers can escape liability to 
their employees and has caused a split among the circuit courts.120
B. Requirement that a Factor Other than Sex Be Nongendered (Bona 
Fide)
In order for an employer’s justification to be considered a factor other than 
sex sufficient to avoid liability, the justification must be bona fide.121 This 
requirement has been articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States 
                                                                                                                     
113 Id. (quoting in part Stopka v. All. of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 
1998)).
114 See id. (first citing Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322; and then citing Cullen v. Ind. Univ. 
Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2003)).
115 See Bowden, supra note 64, at 241.
116 See, e.g., Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(reiterating the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the legitimate business reason requirement 
and advocating for its position); Jeffrey K. Brown, Note, Crossing the Line: The Second, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Misapplication of the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other 
Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 181, 184 (1995).
117 E.g., Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470 (reiterating the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the 
legitimate business reason requirement).
118 E.g., id.
119 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (allowing gender pay differentials where such 
differentials are, inter alia, “based on any other factor” besides sex (emphasis added)).
120 Bowden, supra note 64, at 226 (“Certain courts have read the defense broadly as 
sanctioning any wage differential not overtly based on gender. Indeed, the ambiguous 
language of the fourth affirmative defense has prompted fears that it would permit limitless 
loopholes to the Act.” (footnote omitted)). But see Brown, supra note 116, at 184 (stating 
that the “factor other than sex” defense should be interpreted broadly to follow the statute’s
“plain meaning” rather than the legislative intent). 
121 Bowden, supra note 64, at 248–49.
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and exists regardless of whether a circuit has adopted the additional legitimate 
business reason rule.122
As the Equal Pay Act was enacted in order to eliminate sex-based wage 
differentials,123 when an employer asserts the “factor other than sex” defense, 
the practice or program it is defending must be “more than an honest effort”
and “must have substance and significance.”124 In Hodgson v. Behrens Drug 
Co., the Fifth Circuit held that though Behrens’s training program was neither 
“illusory” nor a “post-event justification” for its unequal pay, the company had 
still violated the Equal Pay Act as there was no definitive end point to the 
program and no woman had ever been a part of the program.125
The bona fide requirement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to 
mean “not . . . on the basis of sex.”126 The Supreme Court discussed the Equal 
Pay Act’s affirmative defenses at length in Washington County v. Gunther, a 
case involving the Bennett Amendment to Title VII.127 The Court 
acknowledged that the Equal Pay Act’s fourth affirmative defense was 
intended to apply to bona fide factors other than sex when used to make 
decisions about employees’ wages.128 The legislative intent in adding the 
“factor other than sex” defense was to encompass bona fide factors as long as 
they do not discriminate on the basis of sex.129
These two cases, when taken together, establish that the bona fide 
requirement, as applied to the “factor other than sex” defense, requires a 
narrow reading of the statutory defense. A bona fide factor other than sex 
cannot be based on sex,130 must consist of more than just an “honest effort,”131
and requires an explanation by the employer beyond merely a nonillusory 
intention or a justification that is simply not created post-event.132 This 
definition of a bona fide factor other than sex is consistent with Congress’s
                                                                                                                     
122 Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981).
123 Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The Equal 
Pay Act clearly mandates the demise of sex-based wage differences except in special, 
narrow circumstances.”).
124 Id. at 1047–48 (discussing the “factor other than sex” defense in relation to a 
training program).
125 Id. at 1047. The training program at issue had never included any women, and 
completion of the program was based on personnel needs. Id. The Fifth Circuit found these 
two characteristics to be fatal for the employer as they indicated that the training program 
was not bona fide. Id. 
126 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171.
127 See generally id. Though it was not a case alleging a violation of the Equal Pay 
Act, the Bennett Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act’s affirmative defenses into 
the statutory scheme of a pay discrimination claim under Title VII. See id. at 170–71.
128 Id. at 170. 
129 Id. at 170–71.
130 Id. 
131 Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1973).
132 Id. at 1047.
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intent for the Equal Pay Act’s fourth affirmative defense to be narrow in 
scope.133
C. Negotiation as a Factor Other than Sex in the Courts
Though there have not been many cases directly considering whether 
negotiation is a factor other than sex, many cases have alluded to plaintiffs’
inability to recover when their pay disparity is due to a salary negotiation, and 
recently one court held that negotiations could be a factor other than sex, but 
only when the opportunity to negotiate was offered to men but not women.134
A recent district court case provides, perhaps, the strongest treatment of 
salary negotiation under the Equal Pay Act.135 In Dreves v. Hudson Group 
(HG) Retail, LLC, the plaintiff brought a claim under the Equal Pay Act when 
her successor in her position, a male, was paid more than she was.136 Her 
employer attributed this pay disparity to the male employee’s superior 
negotiation skills.137 The court rejected this argument, stating that there was 
“no basis” for allowing negotiation to qualify as a factor other than sex 
sufficient to justify the entire pay disparity.138 The court considered this 
employer’s attempted line of argument indistinguishable from the arguments 
that justified higher salaries for men at the enactment of the Equal Pay Act 
itself.139
This view has not been widely accepted, however. When the Fifth Circuit 
was faced with a case involving salary negotiations under the Equal Pay Act 
approximately one year after Dreves, its holding was much narrower than that 
of the Dreves court. In Thibodeaux–Woody v. Houston Community College,
the plaintiff and her male counterpart were given different rules regarding 
negotiation: the woman was told she could not negotiate, and her male 
counterpart’s negotiations were considered.140 The Fifth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act 
claim, stating that “[a] practice is not a bona fide ‘factor other than sex’ if it is 
discriminatorily applied.”141 The court based its ruling not on the use of the 
                                                                                                                     
133 See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171; Hodgson, 475 F.2d at 1047.
134 Thibodeaux–Woody v. Hous. Cmty. Coll., 593 F. App’x 280, 284–85 (5th Cir. 
2014).
135 Dreves v. Hudson Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at 
*8 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
136 Id. at *1.
137 Id. at *8.
138 Id. (“[T]here is simply no basis for the proposition that a male comparator’s ability 
to negotiate a higher salary is a legitimate business-related justification to pay a woman 
less.”).
139 Id. (“Permitting an employer to defend itself simply by showing that a disparity 
was the product of one negotiation with a male employee would lead to the same result: a 
marketplace that values the work of men and women differently.”).
140 Thibodeaux–Woody v. Hous. Cmty. Coll., 593 F. App’x 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2014).
141 Id. at 284.
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negotiation as a factor other than sex but on the way in which negotiation was 
differently applied between genders.142 Presumably, if the employer could 
show that the negotiation policy was applied fairly, it would have been a 
legitimate factor other than sex.143
Other district courts have similarly not followed the approach of the 
Dreves court. The District Court for the District of Arizona explicitly 
“distinguish[ed]” Dreves on a factual basis from the case before the court and 
indicated that salary negotiation could be successfully alleged as a factor other 
than sex.144 In Muriel v. SCI Arizona Funeral Services, Inc., the court read the 
Dreves decision as turning on the fact that Dreves’s successor was initially 
offered more than Dreves’s salary at the end of her employment.145 The court 
in Muriel additionally held that salary negotiations resulting in higher pay for a 
male employee than that of a female employee are not based on gender for the 
purposes of the Equal Pay Act.146
V. ASSURING THAT NEGOTIATION IS NOT A BONA FIDE FACTOR OTHER 
THAN SEX: AN AMENDMENT TO THE EQUAL PAY ACT
As shown above, the application of the “factor other than sex” defense has 
been anything but predictable.147 It has caused a great deal of confusion for 
employers and employees alike, caused a split among the circuits, and led to 
an increasing number of Equal Pay Act claims being dismissed on summary 
judgment.148 When applied to the use of salary negotiations, however, the 
“factor other than sex” defense creates even more complications, including the 
continued existence of the pay gap between genders and a lack of legal 
recourse for women whose income has been negatively affected by the 
practice. As the use of salary negotiations to determine pay is a common 
practice in the workplace,149 its effect on American women is severe. 
                                                                                                                     
142 Id.
143 Id. at 285 (finding an issue of material fact as to the application of the negotiation 
policy). 
144 Muriel v. SCI Ariz. Funeral Servs., Inc., No. CV-14-08160-PCT-DLR, 2015 WL 
6591778, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 2015).
145 Id. 
146 Id. (“The fact that Beavers successfully negotiated a higher salary does not indicate 
that Plaintiff’s gender resulted in her receiving a lower salary for the same job. 
Accordingly, because negotiations and prior salary reasonably explain the pay difference, a 
jury could not find that the discrepancy in salary was based on Plaintiff’s gender.” 
(footnote omitted)). The court additionally noted that Muriel had never “attempted to 
negotiate.” Id. at *3 n.2. 
147 See supra Part IV. 
148 See supra Part IV.
149 Yuki Noguchi, Some Companies Fight Pay Gap by Eliminating Salary 
Negotiations, NPR (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/23/401468571/some-
companies-fight-pay-gap-by-eliminating-salary-negotiations [https://perma.cc/P96K-
Y5MJ].
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A. Negotiation in the Workplace
Negotiation is used by employers both large and small to determine the 
workers’ base wages and wage increases.150 In these negotiations, studies 
show that men are more assertive and four times more likely than women to 
negotiate their pay, according to economics professor Linda Babcock.151 The 
impact of negotiation on women has led some companies to forgo salary 
negotiations with new hires.152 Many companies, however, use negotiations as 
a primary means of determining an employee’s pay.153
Due to the stereotypes imposed upon women in the workplace, ranging 
from the way in which assertive behaviors are perceived to opinions about 
what kinds of positions women are qualified to hold, salary negotiations 
present difficult challenges for women, often resulting in a lower wage than 
their male counterparts.154
Salary negotiations have become a critical part of the American 
workplace.155 From fast food jobs for which applications require applicants to 
list a requested salary to formal salary negotiations for white-collar positions, 
negotiations have become one of the largest determining factors of an 
American worker’s pay.156 Though some companies, like Reddit, have 
eliminated the use of negotiations in determining salary, most companies still 
rely heavily on the practice.157 Even in companies looking to increase the 
number of women in their workforce and in high positions, the use of salary 
negotiations still stifles their female employees’ pay.158
Social science data from a number of researchers and institutions has 
determined that women are perceived differently than men when it comes to 
salary negotiations in the workplace.159 This difference in perception has been 
considered by many to play a significant role in the persistence of the gender 
pay gap in the American workplace.160 In terms of salary negotiations, a 
                                                                                                                     
150 See id. 
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See Editorial, Negotiating the Wage Gap Between Men and Women, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/09/30/negotiating-gender-
wage-gap/Dkukk0XJEishfx5hc3lZML/story.html [https://perma.cc/V42V-UQFU]. 
154 See generally Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype 
Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942 
(2001), https://www.haas.berkeley.edu/faculty/pdf/Kray_Thompson_Galinsky_JPSP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8J4B-BRM5].
155 See id. at 942.
156 Id. (discussing the importance of negotiation skills in all areas of life).
157 Noguchi, supra note 149.
158 See id.
159 See, e.g., Mary L. Rigdon, An Experimental Investigation of Gender Differences in 
Wage Negotiations 2–3, 15 (Oct. 14, 2012) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2
165253 [https://perma.cc/7B4C-2U6N]. 
160 See, e.g., id. 
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prevalent catch phrase is that “women don’t ask.”161 And when they do ask, 
women are often penalized as being too aggressive,162 despite the fact that 
men are nine times more likely than women to ask for higher compensation.163
This aggressiveness, in turn, makes her unconsciously unlikeable and,
therefore, less likely to get the promotion and accompanying higher salary.164
The fear of the repercussions of negotiation lead many women to simply not 
negotiate.165
This creates a catch-22 for many women, as employers often hold those 
who properly negotiate for higher salaries in high regard.166 One large-scale
study found that men are likely “initiating four times as many negotiations as 
women,”167 and 20% of women do not negotiate at all.168 The higher 
likelihood of men to negotiate combined with employer preference for those 
who pursue salary negotiations may lead employers to hold men in a higher 
regard. The effect of this unconscious preference for assertive men and 
disfavor of assertive women may at first only result in a small salary 
discrepancy,169 but over time, that disparity in pay can compound to create a 
large gap in pay between men and women.170
Based on an economic study conducted by Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. 
List, many of Babcock’s findings hold true today.171 Leibbrandt and List 
focused primarily on how the parameters provided to job applicants relating to 
                                                                                                                     
161 See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK (Bantam 
Books 2007) (2003) (discussing the problems salary negotiations pose for working 
women). 
162 Paula Gutlove, Gender Wage Gap Points to Broader Negotiation Disparities,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paula-gutlove/wage-gap-points-to-
broade_b_5228789.html [https://perma.cc/7F2S-DW7U] (last updated June 29, 2014).
163 Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? 
Evidence from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18511, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18511 [https://perma.cc/U
KL4-K7RP].
164 Gutlove, supra note 162.
165 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 161, at 94–95.
166 See id. This double-standard that registers female assertiveness as “bitchy” and 
male assertiveness as commendable limits male behavior as well. Id. at 94. Just as women 
are supposed to be “likeable,” men are expected to be aggressive and often are unable to 
show weakness or vulnerability. Id. 
167 Id. at 3. 
168 Id. at 11. 
169 Id. at 8. 
170 Id. at 8–9 (describing this phenomenon as “molehills becom[ing] mountains”
(citing VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 4–5 (1999))).
Sociologists describe this compounding effect as an “accumulation of disadvantage.” Id. at 
9. The term refers to “minor instances” of bias that lead to “major inequalities.” Id.
(quoting VALIAN, supra, at 3).
171 See Leibbrandt & List, supra note 163, at 1.
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negotiation affected the ways in which men and women negotiated.172 Overall, 
the study found the wage gap to be more significant in settings in which the 
parameters for salary negotiations were ambiguous.173
The difference in perception of salary negotiations of men and women has 
been largely attributed to the ways in which gender is socialized.174 This 
socialization creates a set of gender norms, which in turn guide the ways in 
which men’s and women’s behaviors are perceived as either fitting with, or 
going against, said norms.175 These gender expectations create a form of 
unconscious bias that leads to disfavor of individuals who do not fit within this 
set of norms, such as disfavoring women who negotiate their salary because 
women are not supposed to be aggressive.176
B. Negotiation Is Not a Factor Other than Sex
In order to qualify as a factor other than sex, the practice used to determine 
wages must be bona fide, meaning it cannot be based on sex.177 Some circuits 
additionally require that a factor other than sex must be based in a legitimate 
business reason, though others allow a factor other than sex to be based on any 
practice: legitimate or illegitimate.178 The practice of using negotiations to 
determine pay is neither bona fide nor serves a legitimate business purpose, 
and therefore it cannot and should not be considered a factor other than sex as 
a defense to claims under the Equal Pay Act. 
As the court in Dreves expressed, basing pay determinations on the 
gendered practice of salary negotiations perpetuates the continuation of the 
gender pay gap in the same manner that caused Congress to draft the Equal 
Pay Act more than fifty years ago.179 Without a legal remedy for women who 
are paid less than their male counterparts based on salary negotiations, women 
are again being economically punished for gender stereotypes in the 
workplace.
                                                                                                                     
172 See id. at 2. When the rules of negotiation were explicit, men and women 
negotiated at a comparable rate; however, when the rules of negotiation are unclear, men 
negotiate much more frequently than women. Id. 
173 Id. 
174 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 161, at 68–122. In the chapters “Nice Girls 
Don’t Ask” and “Scaring the Boys,” Babcock and Laschever discuss how certain behaviors 
and traits are taught and learned from a very young age, thereby creating expectations for 
the ways in which men and women should behave. Id. When an individual does not fit 
these gender norms, he or she is perceived negatively. Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 203 n.2(b) (8th ed. 2013) (explaining the implications of implicit or 
unconscious bias). 
177 Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170–71 (1981).
178 Brown, supra note 116, at 184–85. 
179 Dreves v. Hudson Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at 
*8 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
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In Thibodeaux–Woody, the Fifth Circuit explicitly left open the question of 
whether or not the use of salary negotiations to determine pay could be 
considered a factor other than sex.180 The court applied the bona fide 
requirement established in Washington County v. Gunther and Hodgson v. 
Behrens Drug Co. and determined that the employer’s utilization of 
negotiation to determine salary was not applied evenly between genders and 
therefore was not bona fide in its application.181 Under the test the court 
applied, however, salary negotiations in general would not meet the 
qualifications to be a bona fide factor other than sex. 
Even when salary negotiations are not applied in a blatantly discriminatory 
fashion as in Thibodeaux–Woody, the social science research is clear in its 
finding: salary negotiations contribute significantly to disparities in pay 
between men and women.182 The unconscious bias that creates a difference in 
perception for women and men who negotiate183 serves as a form of 
discriminatory application that is unacceptable under the bona fide 
requirement.184 Many employers, such as Reddit discussed above,185 are aware 
of the research indicating that women’s pay is often disproportionally 
negatively affected by salary negotiations, due to the widespread coverage of 
the issue in the media,186 as well as coverage on job posting sites like 
Monster.187 In the face of the extensive research indicating that salary 
                                                                                                                     
180 Thibodeaux–Woody v. Hous. Cmty. Coll., 593 F. App’x 280, 283–84 (5th Cir. 
2014) (deciding the case instead on the ground that the employer’s salary negotiations were 
not offered equally to both genders and therefore the practice was not bona fide).
181 Id. at 284–85 (“If negotiation is not available to persons of both sexes, it cannot be 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay differential.”).
182 See supra Part V.A. 
183 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 161, at 94–95 (discussing different 
perceptions of men and women when they participate in salary negotiations); Maria 
Konnikova, Lean Out: The Dangers for Women Who Negotiate, NEW YORKER (June 10, 
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/lean-out-the-dangers-for-
women-who-negotiate [https://perma.cc/88N3-PWTQ] (detailing the economic dangers 
posed for women who attempt to negotiate their salaries).
184 Dreves, 2013 WL 2634429, at *8.
185 See supra Part V.A.
186 See generally Editorial, supra note 153; Gutlove, supra note 162; Katie Johnston,
Bill Aims to Close the Gender Wage Gap, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/02/22/bill-aims-close-gender-wage-gap/eAX
5j5HxHZU9h14orWLXJJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/X4J3-UM36]; Konnikova, supra 
note 183; Laura J. Kray, The Best Way to Eliminate the Gender Pay Gap? Ban Salary 
Negotiations., WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverythi
ng/wp/2015/05/21/the-best-way-to-way-to-eliminate-the-gender-pay-gap-ban-salary-negoti
ations/?utm_term=.49bd4b714c0e [https://perma.cc/HG62-87QM]; Noguchi, supra note 
149.
187 See Christina Lopez, How Salary Negotiation Contributes to the Wage Gap,
MONSTER, http://www.monster.com/career-advice/article/Salary-Negotiation-Gender-Wag
e-Gap [https://perma.cc/2URY-PGTW].
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negotiations contribute to the continuing existence of the wage gap, companies 
still continue to use negotiations as a means to determine salary.188
C. Previous Unsuccessful Solutions
There have been many attempts to reenergize both federal and state Equal 
Pay Act legislation in order to provide for the remedies Congress intended.189
Two of the most prominent attempts have been in the California legislature 
and the federal Congress.190 Congress has tried many times to amend the 
Federal Equal Pay Act with the Paycheck Fairness Act but has thus far been 
unsuccessful in passing the amendment.191 In 2015, California passed what is 
considered to be the “strictest” equal pay legislation in the United States.192
Though both pieces of legislation make strides towards addressing the 
problems posed by equal pay legislation in eliminating the pay gap, minor 
textual changes could significantly increase the likelihood that the legislation 
would prohibit employers from successfully asserting salary negotiation as a 
factor other than sex.
1. The Paycheck Fairness Act
The Paycheck Fairness Act, as introduced many times in Congress, would 
require business necessity for the “factor other than sex” defense and create a 
grant program to improve salary negotiation skills for women, among 
proposing other changes to the Equal Pay Act.193 The Paycheck Fairness Act, 
as it has been previously introduced, is insufficient to properly address the 
issues that face the courts when applying the “factor other than sex” defense to 
negotiations. The Paycheck Fairness Act focuses primarily on the application 
of the “factor other than sex” defense to “legitimate business purpose[s]” such 
                                                                                                                     
188 See Kray, supra note 186; see also supra Part V.A.
189 See Laura Bassett, Paycheck Fairness Act Blocked Again by Senate GOP,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/paycheck-
fairness-act_n_5825644.html [https://perma.cc/2J4M-WYKY]; see also Jackie Borchardt,
Democratic Ohio Lawmakers Introduce ‘Equal Pay’ Bill, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 23, 
2015), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2015/09/democratic_ohio_lawmakers_int
r.html [https://perma.cc/N54J-7NHL]; Johnston, supra note 186; Bourree Lam, The U.S.’s
‘Strictest’ Equal-Pay Law Is About to Go into Effect, ATLANTIC (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/california-fair-pay-2016/422292/ 
[https://perma.cc/3WXB-VXF2]; Jill L. Rosenberg, New York State Expands Equal Pay 
Law and Other Workplace Protections for Women, ORRICK EMP. L. & LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 
26, 2015), http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2015/10/26/new-york-state-expands-equal-
pay-law-and-other-workplace-protections-for-women/ [https://perma.cc/C5XJ-VVYG].
190 Elzer, supra note 12, at 30 (advocating for the passage of the Paycheck Fairness 
Act); Lam, supra note 189 (discussing the implications of California’s state legislation). 
191 Bassett, supra note 189 (discussing the federal Paycheck Fairness Act). 
192 Lam, supra note 189.
193 See generally Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1619, 114th Cong. (2015).
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as market forces, prior salary, qualifications, and experience, even if unrelated 
to the specific position.194 Negotiation presents different challenges than 
“market forces” or prior salary, as it is an independent process and necessitates 
a specific provision to address the issue.195
When it was last formally introduced in Congress, the text of the bill 
proposed that the factor other than sex must be bona fide, but it also included a 
provision on business necessity.196 Though the legislation required a factor 
other than sex to be bona fide, no court has held that negotiation is not a bona 
fide factor other than sex when evenly relied upon for both sexes.197 As such, 
this protection does not solve the current problem in the courts until judges 
begin to apply the bona fide requirement when negotiation is being offered as 
a legitimate factor other than sex. 
The Paycheck Fairness Act also has a “business necessity” requirement.198
An employer could argue that salary negotiations are the most effective and 
common way to determine pay and therefore serve a business necessity.199 As 
salary negotiations are not sex-based on their face,200 this business necessity 
requirement could lead courts to continue to allow negotiation to be 
considered a factor other than sex.
The best case for ruling out negotiation as a factor other than sex under the 
Paycheck Fairness Act is that salary negotiation is often not “job-related.”201
Especially for fields in which negotiation is not a facet of the job itself, it is 
not sufficiently job-related to justify allowing salary negotiations to qualify as 
a factor other than sex.202 However, given the courts’ narrowing of the Equal 
Pay Act,203 the deference to employer practices will probably allow the 
practice to continue under the language of the Paycheck Fairness Act.
                                                                                                                     
194 NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX” LOOPHOLE 
IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT (Apr. 2011), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/4.11.11_f
actor_other_than_sex_fact_sheet_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKQ8-GRZF].
195 See Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 819.
196 H.R. 1619 § 3(a)(3) (“The bona fide factor defense described in subparagraph 
(A)(iv) shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that such factor (i) is not based upon 
or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation; (ii) is job-related with respect to 
the position in question; (iii) is consistent with business necessity; and (iv) accounts for the 
entire differential in compensation at issue. Such defense shall not apply where the 
employee demonstrates that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve the 
same business purpose without producing such differential and that the employer has 
refused to adopt such alternative practice.”).
197 See supra Part IV.C. 
198 H.R. 1619 § 3(a)(3).
199 See id.
200 See supra Part IV.C.
201 See H.R. 1619 § 3(a)(3) (“The bona fide factor defense described in subparagraph 
(A)(iv) shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that such factor . . . is job-related 
with respect to the position in question . . . .”).
202 Elzer, supra note 12, at 32. 
203 See supra Part IV.C.
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An aspect of the Paycheck Fairness Act that should be retained in any 
subsequent attempts to amend the Equal Pay Act, which does not fully 
foreclose the possibility of salary negotiations as a means to determine pay, is 
the authorization of grants to provide negotiation skills training for women and 
girls.204 Especially in the Paycheck Fairness Act, which may leave negotiation 
as a viable means to determine pay for employers, this training for women and 
girls in how to effectively negotiate plays an important role in reaching 
equality in pay between women and men.205 Providing funding for employers 
to limit the discriminatory effect in their negotiation policies would also aid in 
determining whether or not employers have made an “honest effort” to base 
pay on a factor other than sex.206 The existence of this provision, however, 
may lead courts to assume that salary negotiations are still acceptable, as the 
legislation provides for a means by which to train women and girls to become 
better at negotiation. This implies that there will be a need for strong 
negotiation skills and therefore that salary negotiations will not be excluded 
under the present legislation.
2. California’s Legislation
In October of 2015, the California legislature, with approval from the 
Governor, amended its version of the Equal Pay Act to attempt to remedy 
some of the issues presented by the “factor other than sex” defense.207
California’s legislation was similar to the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act but 
included some key phrasing differences, primarily a definition of “business 
necessity.”208
                                                                                                                     
204 See H.R. 1619 § 5(a)(2) (“In carrying out the program, the Secretary of Labor may 
make grants on a competitive basis to eligible entities, to carry out negotiation skills 
training programs for girls and women. “); id. § 5(a)(5) (“An entity that receives a grant 
under this subsection shall use the funds made available through the grant to carry out an 
effective negotiation skills training program that empowers girls and women. The training 
provided through the program shall help girls and women strengthen their negotiation skills 
to allow the girls and women to obtain higher salaries and rates of compensation that are 
equal to those paid to similarly situated male employees.”).
205 See Elzer, supra note 12, at 33.
206 See Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1973).
207 See generally S.B. 358, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (codified as amended at 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West Supp. 2017)).
208 See id. § 2(a) (“An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less 
than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for substantially similar work, when 
viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar 
working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates: (1) The wage differential is 
based upon one or more of the following factors: . . . (D) A bona fide factor other than sex, 
such as education, training, or experience. This factor shall apply only if the employer 
demonstrates that the factor is not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in 
compensation, is job related with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with 
a business necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, ‘business necessity’ means an 
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon effectively fulfills 
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Although California’s legislation provides more thorough protection for 
employees than the federally proposed Paycheck Fairness Act, it still poses 
potential difficulties when it comes to the treatment of negotiation as a factor 
other than sex. As the California legislation is based largely on the Paycheck 
Fairness Act,209 many of the deficiencies described above also create potential 
obstacles for plaintiffs who seek to hold their employers liable for pay 
disparities created by the use of salary negotiations.210
The addition of a definition of “business necessity” limits some of the 
concerns addressed above; it does not assure that negotiation cannot serve a 
“legitimate business purpose.” As the use of salary negotiations is so 
widespread,211 courts will be slow to find that legislation has forbidden 
employers from using it as a means to determine pay. Additionally, salary 
negotiation often “fulfills” the purpose it is intended to serve: rewarding good 
negotiators and penalizing those who are less effective.212 As such, whether or 
not salary negotiations are a valid factor other than sex will turn on whether or 
not they serve an “overriding legitimate business purpose.”213 Given the 
courts’ unwillingness to hold that negotiation is not a factor other than sex, it 
is likely that salary negotiations will be considered to meet this requirement. 
Notably, the California legislation does not include a grant provision for 
negotiation training programs for women and girls.214 This may be the result 
of a number of factors, ranging from the difference in the monetary 
capabilities of state and federal budgets to the desire to eliminate salary 
negotiations as a factor other than sex. If the absence of the grant provision is 
due to a lack of state budgetary funds, the need for a federal amendment to the 
Equal Pay Act becomes more significant, even if the amendment does not 
sufficiently foreclose the possibility that salary negotiations may be used to 
determine pay.
                                                                                                                     
the business purpose it is supposed to serve. This defense shall not apply if the employee 
demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business 
purpose without producing the wage differential. (2) Each factor relied upon is applied 
reasonably. (3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the entire wage 
differential.”). 
209 Gary R. Siniscalco, As Calif. Goes on Equal Pay, So Goes the Nation?, LAW360
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/699503/as-calif-goes-on-equal-pay-so-
goes-the-nation [https://perma.cc/48QC-5PA3].
210 See supra Part V.C.1.
211 See supra Part V.A. 
212 Kray et al., supra note 154, at 942.
213 Cal. S.B. 358.
214 See id. 
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D. An Amendment to the Equal Pay Act Is Necessary to Provide a 
Legitimate Legal Remedy for Those Harmed by the Gendered Biases 
Present in Negotiation
Given the insufficiencies with both the Paycheck Fairness Act and 
California’s legislation,215 slight changes would be necessary in order to draft 
legislation that would assure negotiation could not be considered a factor other 
than sex. 
1. Proposed Legislation
As California’s legislation comes the closest to providing what is 
necessary in order to assure that the practice of negotiations as a means to 
determine pay is not an acceptable factor other than sex, it serves as the best 
model for drafting legislation to sufficiently address the problem. The text of 
California’s legislation is shown below in roman type with changes indicated 
in italics.
(D) A bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or 
experience. This factor shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that the 
factor is not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in 
compensation or an employment practice proven to have a disproportionately 
negative effect on the wage of members of a certain gender, is job related 
with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a business 
necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, “business necessity” means an 
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon 
effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve. This defense 
shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business 
practice exists that would serve the same business purpose while significantly 
minimizing or without producing the wage differential.
(2) Each factor relied upon is applied reasonably. 
(3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the entire wage 
differential.216
In selecting language for the statute, it is necessary to avoid using the 
phrase disparate impact.217 Although it is likely that salary negotiations may 
indeed have a disparate impact on women, the phrase is fraught with its own 
legal framework and a heated dispute as to whether or not disparate impact 
                                                                                                                     
215 See supra Part V.C.1–.2. 
216 This proposed legislation is largely based on California’s legislation passed in 
October 2015: S.B. 358. See Cal. S.B. 358; see also Part V.C.2. 
217 See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs established 
the concept of “disparate impact” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Susan D. Carle, A
Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 
256–57 (2011).
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should be a basis for recovery.218 Additionally, disparate impact claims are not 
cognizable under the Equal Pay Act.219 Regardless of the state of disparate 
impact under the Equal Pay Act, salary negotiations constitute a form of 
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact, as the use of negotiation to 
determine pay is not a neutral policy as required under the disparate impact 
framework.220 As discussed above, the discriminatory effect of salary 
negotiations is the result of unconscious bias, which is not neutral in nature.221
This type of unconscious or implicit bias222 fits under the Equal Pay Act’s pay 
discrimination scheme rather than a disparate impact framework, as the Equal 
Pay Act does not require explicit proof of intent to discriminate.223 Because 
the use of salary negotiations to determine pay inherently involves gender 
bias,224 the policy is not neutral, as would be required under a disparate impact 
scheme.225 As such, it is both necessary and appropriate to avoid the term 
disparate impact in proposed amendments to the Equal Pay Act.
Though there are potential ways in which a plaintiff may prove that 
alternative employment practices are available to an employer who asserts the 
“factor other than sex” defense,226 requiring a plaintiff to prove that a wage 
                                                                                                                     
218 See Carle, supra note 217, at 253–55, 257–60.
219 Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An 
analogy to disparate-impact litigation under Title VII does not justify a ‘business reason’
requirement under the Equal Pay Act, however, because the Equal Pay Act deals 
exclusively with disparate treatment. It does not have a disparate-impact component.”).
220 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (discussing practices that are neutral on their face but 
have a discriminatory effect). See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing sex stereotypes and unconscious stereotyping).
221 See supra Part V.A. 
222 Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The ultimate 
question is whether the employee has been treated disparately ‘because of race.’ This is so 
regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or 
simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.”); see also Melissa Hart, 
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 746 
(2005) (addressing the influence of unconscious bias in employment-related 
decisionmaking); Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 488–90 (2005) (discussing 
unconscious bias theory in the courts).
223 Beck–Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. 424).
224 See supra Part V.A. 
225 The proposed amendment does not alter a plaintiff’s burden to prove her prima 
facie case of pay discrimination. See supra Part III.B (discussing the prima facie Equal Pay 
Act case). However, this proposed amendment permits plaintiffs to rebut a defendant’s
affirmative defense with evidence of the gendered effects of salary negotiations.
226 See, e.g., Elzer, supra note 12, at 32–33 (“A plaintiff might be able to meet this 
burden by devising a method of demonstrating negotiation skills outside of the salary 
context. For example, during the plaintiff’s initial job interview, the employer could 
conduct a mock negotiation session that mimics the prospective job’s actual duties. 
Alternatively, the employer could observe the plaintiff during an actual negotiation session 
or could ask the negotiation partner to evaluate the plaintiff’s negotiation skills.”).
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differential would not exist at all under this alternative practice is a difficult 
standard to meet once an employer has proven that salary negotiation is related 
to the job. Including the “significantly minimizing” language gives plaintiffs 
more leeway while still requiring that the alternative practice is one that would 
have a substantial impact on pay rather than only having a minimal effect. 
2. Consistent with Congress’s Intent in Passing the Equal Pay Act
Congress’s intent in passing the Equal Pay Act was to further the rights of 
women in the workplace and eradicate the pay disparity between men and 
women.227 This proposed legislation addresses one of the most significant 
barriers women face in achieving equal pay: salary negotiations.228 As such, 
eliminating salary negotiations as a means by which plaintiffs are denied relief 
under the Equal Pay Act would further the intentions of Congress in passing 
the Equal Pay Act more than fifty years ago.229
Congress affirmed its goal of eliminating the pay gap in 2009 when it 
enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as an amendment to Title VII.230 This 
was the first legislation signed by President Barack Obama.231 On the seventh 
anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, President Obama announced 
an executive action requiring companies of 100 or more employees to report 
pay information to the EEOC, and the President called upon Congress to pass 
the Paycheck Fairness Act.232 Following President Obama’s renewed call to 
Congress to pass the Paycheck Fairness Act, the Administration described the 
Act as “commonsense legislation” that would provide women with “tools to 
fight pay discrimination.”233 The President also referred to the legislation 
passed in California aimed at achieving this goal.234 The desire to fight pay 
discrimination expressed by the Obama Administration is the same that 
motivated Congress to pass the Equal Pay Act, the Bennett Amendment, and 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: pay equality between men and women. The 
legislation proposed above furthers that same goal. 
                                                                                                                     
227 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); see also Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 1970).
228 See supra Part V.A (discussing the widespread use of salary negotiations to 
determine employees’ pay). 
229 See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 (1963); see also S. REP. NO. 88-176 (1963).
230 See infra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act).
231 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, FACT SHEET: New Steps 
to Advance Equal Pay on the Seventh Anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Jan. 
29, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/fact-sheet-new-steps-
advance-equal-pay-seventh-anniversary-lilly [https://perma.cc/U2QW-JZ3T]. 
232 Bourree Lam, Obama’s New Equal-Pay Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/eeoc-pay-discrimination-obama/4339
26/ [https://perma.cc/R2ST-KYSU]. 
233 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 231.
234 Id. 
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3. Its Intended Effect
The legislation is intended to provide a remedy for women who receive 
lesser pay than their male counterparts based on their employers’ reliance on a 
means of determining pay that has proven to harm women’s overall wages.235
This would not be the first time an amendment has been utilized to fix a 
shortcoming within a pay discrimination statute. In addition to the Bennett 
Amendment to Title VII, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was enacted 
as a “legislative fix” to resolve issues with the statutory limits imposed on pay 
discrimination claims under Title VII.236 This legislative solution to an 
interpretation issue within the courts was an effective means to assure that an 
antidiscrimination statute was being enforced in line with its purpose and not 
being narrowed by the courts’ interpretation.237
Although the legislation drafted above is broader than both the Paycheck 
Fairness Act and the California legislation,238 it does not infringe upon 
employers’ use of bona fide factors other than sex to determine pay.239 The 
language critical to the exclusion of salary negotiations is “an employment 
practice proven to have a disproportionately negative effect on the wage of 
members of a certain gender.”240 The requirement that the practice can be 
proven to have a disproportionate effect limits the employment practices that 
may be considered. As the use of salary negotiations has significant social 
science data241 to support the effect of the practice on women, it would meet 
this proof standard; however, it is unlikely that other practices commonly used 
to determine pay, such as education, experience, performance reviews, etc., 
could rise to this level of evidence of a disproportionate effect on women’s
pay. Additionally, with the passage of broader legislation, employers will 
adapt their practices to avoid liability under an expanded statute. This 
requirement of proof encourages employers to be diligent in choosing their 
means of determining pay and research their practices before implementing 
them. 
                                                                                                                     
235 See supra Part V.A (discussing the connection between reliance on salary 
negotiations and the gender pay gap). 
236 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://nwlc.org/resources/lilly-ledbetter-fair-pay-act/ [https://perma.cc/JM3P-6LSJ]. The 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was passed following a Supreme Court decision for an 
employer that was counter to the goals of Title VII. Id.
237 Id. 
238 See supra Part V.C.1–.2.
239 See supra Part V.D.1.
240 See supra Part V.D.1.
241 See supra Part V.A. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
The use of salary negotiations by employers to determine pay and to 
justify a discrepancy in pay between their male and female employees should 
not qualify as a bona fide factor other than sex under the Equal Pay Act. 
Allowing employers to skirt liability in this fashion is both inconsistent with 
Congress’s intent in passing the Equal Pay Act and perpetuates the 
continuation of the gender pay gap in America. If Congress’s hope of 
eradicating the gender pay gap is to be realized, employers cannot continue to 
be allowed to negotiate around the Equal Pay Act’s protection. 
An amendment to the Equal Pay Act would not only aid in providing the 
legal recourse promised by the Act, but would also play a critical role in 
shaping the American workplace. A person’s pay is critical to her perception 
of her worth as an employee. If employers are pushed to develop pay policies 
that level the playing field between men and women, not only would the 
American workforce come closer to achieving pay equality, but women would 
be shown that their value is equal to that of their male counterparts, thus 
empowering women to work towards their fullest potential. Eliminating salary 
negotiations as a factor other than sex is a step towards realizing the Equal Pay 
Act’s purpose: equal pay for equal work.242 After more than fifty years, it is 
time to get more than only 79% of the way there. 
                                                                                                                     
242 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (“Congress’ purpose in 
enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic 
problem of employment discrimination in private industry . . . .”).

